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China has been the centre of attention in the world of development 
cooperation for recently launching or sponsoring the launch of sev-
eral new development banks and funds, and infrastructure is the 
biggest brand under all of them. These include the US$100bn Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the US$50bn New Develop-
ment Bank (NDB, to increase to $100bn) of the BRICS countries, and 
the US$40bn Silk Road Fund (SRF) under the grand Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (or ‘Belt and Road’) 
Initiative. Much media and scholarly discussions have primarily 
focused on whether these new institutions challenge the dominance 
of the West in development assistance and global economic govern-
ance. Less attention has been paid on how they work on the ground 
– the initiatives are all quite new after all. The SRF was launched in 
December 2014, (following the announcements of the Belt and Road 
Initiative in late 2013), the NDB in July 2015, and the AIIB opened 
the door for business in January 2016. Only the SRF has started to 
fund a 1.65-billion-dollar Karot hydropower project in Pakistan, and 
the AIIB has just revealed its first project, also in Pakistan.1 
 
While we wait and see how China’s new international development 
initiatives pan out on the global political and economic maps, it helps 
to have a look at how China’s infrastructure projects have fared both 
at home and abroad in the past. Does economic growth, boosted by 
infrastructure investment, necessarily benefit development? 
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Infrastructure has been a significant component of the PRC’s aid and 
investment in other developing countries, notably in Africa and Latin 
America. It has often, but not always, been bundled with natural 
resources. They have mostly served the roles of ‘diplomatic gifts’, item 
of barter trade for natural resources, and facilitator of industrial zones 
or commodities trade. The current wave of development cooperation 
initiatives from China, however, has infrastructure as the central com-
ponent. Plus, the initiatives are already having a significant impact on 
the allocation of projects funded by China. A recent report by Grisons 
Peak demonstrates that most of Chinese policy banks’ loans of over 
one billion USD in 2013-2015 have been given to projects along the 
planned Belt and Road routes. The share of each continent in alloca-
tion of such loans has seen a sharp decrease in Africa, with a signifi-
cant increase in Asia and moderate rise in Europe. Moreover, India and 
Vietnam, two countries that are not strategic friends with China, are 
amongst the top twenty recipient countries of Chinese policy banks 
loans during 2013-15.2  This underlines the pragmatic nature of 
China’s recent overseas development projects – economic interests are 
crucial to the funding decisions.
This policy brief discusses the economic impacts of China’s past 
infrastructure projects to caution against several potential risks. To 
be more specific, three issues are highlighted: first, low usage and 
low profitability; second, debt and broken contracts; third, favourit-
ism towards state-owned companies.
Before we do that, two caveats need to be stated. First, social and 
environmental impacts are not included in this policy brief, despite 
their importance, because of limited scope and much coverage in 
existing studies. There are numerous reports about poor labour 
conditions, forced or poorly compensated displacement, and envi-
ronmental problems of Chinese projects. The studies in this category 
often fail to take into consideration the difficulty within China to 
combat pollution and irregular labour practices. They also tend 
to ignore the fact that many of such behaviours are conducted by 
companies without the oversight of the Chinese government. Being 
2 ‘Chinese Policy Bank Loans and the Rapid Buildout of the 21st Century 
Maritime Routes (2013-2015)’, Grisons Peak Special Feature, March 
2016, available http://www.chinainvestmentresearch.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/Article_Chinese-Policy-Bank-Loans_2013-2015.pdf. 
Summary
In view of China’s recent launch of several new development 
banks (AIIB, OBOR, NDB) with a central focus on infrastruc-
ture, this NUPI Brief takes a look at how China’s infrastructure 
projects have fared both at home and abroad in the past. It asks 
the question: Does economic growth, boosted by infrastructure 
investment, necessarily benefit development? Admitting that in-
frastructure has played a crucial role in China’s development, as 
well as contributed to the changes in other developing countries, 
this brief cautions against several potential economic risks. To 
be more specific, three issues are highlighted: first, low usage 
and low profitability; second, debt and broken contracts; third, 
favouritism towards state-owned companies.
1 Reuters, ‘China’s AIIB to co-finance first project with ADB in Pakistan’, 3 
May 2016.
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aware of its image, Beijing has consistently urged Chinese compa-
nies to comply with local laws when they ‘go out’. The question then 
is whether the host country has complete regulations; if not, whether 
Chinese companies should instead adopt international standards. 
With regards to the new development banks, the Silk Road Fund is 
wholly owned by China, and many projects under the Road and Belt 
Initiative will be funded by Chinese policy banks. The Chinese actors 
will thus be decisive on their labour and environmental records. The 
NDB and AIIB, on the other hand, are multilateral banks, and China 
has been trying to demonstrate that they adopt international stand-
ards in labour and environment safeguards.
Second, infrastructure has played a crucial role in China’s devel-
opment, as well as contributed to the changes in other developing 
countries. At home, infrastructure development has facilitated 
industrialisation and trade, and provided connectivity, energy and 
employment. Many foreign companies still invest and outsource 
production to China despite the higher wages there compared with 
some other developing economies, because China has a better 
infrastructure network. Chinese engineers and construction manu-
facturers have gained knowledge and experience, particularly under 
tough working conditions – a competitive edge of Chinese construc-
tion companies in bidding for projects in developing countries. At 
the onset of the recent global financial crisis, Beijing swiftly rolled 
out a Keynesian-style stimulus package in November 2008 that had 
a major component of infrastructure. Despite the side effects, it did 
help China stabilise growth and create jobs.3  
Abroad, infrastructure is regarded by many African countries as the 
single most important contribution that China has made to their 
development, despite all the controversies, and this contribution is 
where China differs from colonisers and traditional donors.4 African 
countries believe it was thanks to Chinese investment, particularly 
in infrastructure, that the continent has changed drastically in the 
past decade. Roads, bridges and railways, telecommunications, 
water systems and power stations have removed some bottlenecks 
that resource-rich countries had faced, improved the people’s access 
to public services and world markets, as well as facilitated investors 
from other countries to come in. Governments and international 
organisations, including the World Bank, IMF and ADB, have wel-
comed China’s new development banks as a much-needed source of 
financing to fill in the infrastructure gap: US$8 trillion by 2020 in 
Asia according to ADB and one trillion dollars per year worldwide 
according to the World Bank. 
It is with these caveats and the context of rather positive interna-
tional responses that this policy brief seeks to address three specific 
economic issues of Chinese overseas infrastructure drive: low usage 
and low profitability, debt and broken contracts, and favouritism 
towards state-owned companies. 
Low usage and low profitability
China has become the largest infrastructure market in the world, 
partly as inheritance to the Soviet-style planned economy that cher-
ished heavy industries and partly as a strategy to facilitate urbani-
sation, reform and opening. Moreover, local governments have in 
the past decades been evaluated by local GDP growth as the most 
important performance indicator. Given that local officials usually 
rotate every three or five years, they resort to big projects, typically 
infrastructure and real estate, as the easy and fast ways to stimulate 
growth. It is also a sector where grey incomes abound for corrupt 
officials and their cronies, as will be discussed later. 
Low usage and redundancy have become prominent problems in 
China’s domestic infrastructure projects in the past decade, exac-
erbated by the government’s response to the global financial crisis 
and stimuli afterwards. There are numerous examples of ‘ghost cit-
ies’; the most known one being Ordos in Inner Mongolia.5 There is 
overcapacity in ports, highways, windmills, and small airports. Uti-
lisation rate of Chinese highways was only 12% of the seven major 
OECD countries, and the average utilisation rate for small airports 
was only 50% in 2009.6 A government-sponsored domestic study of 
the high-speed railway development finds that because of the high 
ticket price and limited demand in less developed areas, the rider-
ship on some high-speed rails were lower than expected and some 
projects have become economically unsustainable. There are even 
instances of redundant construction; for example, two parallel lines 
were constructed between Tianjin and Beijing and between Shang-
hai and Nanjing in two separate bigger projects. Moreover, the high 
ticket price and expansion of space used for high-speed rails have 
sometimes led to congestion on normal roads, obstructing passenger 
and freight transportation.7 
The similar problems of redundancy and low profitability can be seen 
in some overseas projects too. In 2011, China helped build a satellite 
town, Kilamba, outside Luanda, the capital of Angola, in exchange 
for the latter’s oil. The town, however, became a ghost city, because 
the price was well out of reach of two-thirds of Angolans, mortgages 
were difficult to obtain, and flats were mainly awarded to civil serv-
ants as a ‘bonus’. Only after the Angolan government ordered the 
price to drop and opened the state-backed mortgage to the public in 
2013 did more middle-class people move in. In July 2015, there were 
80,000 residents according to official news sources, in comparison 
with the half a million planned for the town.8  
Low profitability is a natural consequence of low-usage infrastruc-
ture. Indeed the financial returns to such capital-intensive public 
projects are usually expected in the long term, and some projects 
serve the purpose of public goods instead of earning profits. How-
ever, there is an opportunity cost in how the same money could be 
spent elsewhere and earn more profits or benefit people’s lives in 
a more adequate way. As most of the infrastructure projects would 
need co-financing from host governments or host country compa-
nies, allocating much resources to infrastructure could significantly 
distort the developmental path of the country in the long term and 
exacerbate inequality in the short term, as will be discussed later. 
3 See Yang Jiang (2015) ‘Vulgarisation of Keynesianism in China’s response 
to the global financial crisis’, Review of International Political Economy, 
22, 2, p. 360-390.
4 Reuters (2015) ‘West still treats Africa as former vassals’ – South Africa’s 
Zuma to RT’, 10 May, https://www.rt.com/news/257353-zuma-africa-rus-
sia-china-brics/
5 ‘Ordos, China: A Modern Ghost Town’, Time, http://content.time.com/
time/photogallery/0,29307,1975397,00.html. ’Data Mining Reveals the 
Extent of China’s Ghost Cities’, MIT Technology Review, 2 Nov. 2015. 
6 EU Chamber of Commerce in China, ‘Overcapacity in China: Causes, Im-
pacts and Recommendations’ (2009), available at http://www.european-
chamber.com.cn/ en/overcapacity-in-china. ‘Overcapacity continues to 
pressure Chinese port operators’, Moody’s Report, Feb. 2015.
7 Min Chen, Hailong Tang and Kun Zhang, ‘Some Critical Issues in the De-
velopment of Chinese High-Speed Rail: Challenges and Coping Strategies’, 
Journal of Transportation Technologies 2014, 4, 164-74.
 8 ‘Angola’s China-Built Ghost Town’, BBC, 3 July 2012, http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-18646243. Chloé Buire, ‘Views of Suburban Lu-
anda: Banishing the Ghosts from Kilamba’, Africa Research Institute, 2 
Sep. 2015, http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/blog/views-of-subur-
ban-luanda-banishing-the-ghosts-from-kilamba/.
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Debt and broken contracts
China followed the Keynesian prescription on debt financing to 
invest in big infrastructure projects at the onset of the global finan-
cial crisis. These projects have caused a sharp rise of government 
debt. From 2008 to 2012, China’s total debt to GDP ratio jumped 
from 125% to 215%. By the middle of 2013, outstanding local 
government debt stood at Rmb18 trillion, up 80 per cent in just 
two years.9 Default has already happened to some infrastructure 
projects sponsored by local governments; for example, the Yunnan 
Highway project in 2011, the Qilu Bank in Shandong Province in 
2013, and Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science and Technology 
Company in 2014. Two researchers at the National Development 
and Research Commission found in 2014 that nearly 40% of Chi-
nese investment projects were either not finished on time or not 
completed at all.10  They also found that the incremental capital-
output ratio (ICOR) has risen 50%, from 2.6, (for the period of 
1979-1996) to 4 (for the period of 1997-2013), which means about 
50% more capital is needed to produce an extra unit of output.11 
Underling this declining efficiency of capital usage is massive 
expansion of infrastructure and real estate investment. 
The problem is that infrastructure investment can become addic-
tive. The infrastructure investment in China in recent year has 
apparently not had much ‘spillover’ effect in other sectors except 
generating more over-capacity in traditional sectors like steel, 
cement, glass etc. To a government that wants to maintain GDP 
growth, the short-term solution is to pump more money into 
infrastructure and construction. Although the Xi-Li government 
recognizes the inefficiency and the enormous local government 
debt that infrastructure investment has created under the previous 
government during the global financial crisis, Beijing has approved 
several ‘mini’ packages of infrastructure stimulus, justifying them 
by underlining the selective and high-tech nature. When the econ-
omy slowed in 2014, local officials were tasked with propping up 
growth with more infrastructure investment. However, even such 
investment stimulus is running out of steam, having less and less 
effect in a slowing Chinese economy. At the same time, efforts by 
Beijing to close down local government finance companies, which 
have built up dangerous levels of debt, stopped in May 2015, when 
the government allowed them to borrow again. 
One risk with local debt financing for infrastructure in China is that 
most of these loans are guaranteed with land or investment capital 
is from the revenue of land transfer.12  Transfer of land usage has 
been the major source of income for local governments since the 
fiscal reform in 1994. The transfer of land for infrastructure and 
real estate development has pushed up the price of fixed assets and 
created bubbles, which have become the biggest risk in the Chinese 
economy today. 
Most of China’s infrastructure projects have so far been guaranteed 
by natural resources of the host countries. Often it is the future export 
of natural resources to China, in a form of barter trade. As the slow-
ing Chinese economy needs fewer commodities, global commodities 
prices have started to fall. Some countries may not be able to return 
the debt they owed in infrastructure through commodities export. In 
countries endowed with fewer natural resources, it is possible for a 
Chinese financial institution to provide guarantee for a Chinese loan, 
as China has done in the successful bid for high-speed rail network 
between Jakarta and Bandung in Indonesia. The continued funding 
of the project then depends on the health of Chinese financial insti-
tutions. It would be interesting to observe whether land financing 
would be copied to China’s overseas infrastructure projects.
 
Default is also happening to some of China’s overseas infra-
structure projects. In Sri Lanka, nearly 70% of the infrastructure 
projects from 2009 to 2015 had reportedly been funded by China 
and built by Chinese companies, and the country was heading into 
a debt crisis in 2015. Relations between the two countries were 
strained when the newly elected Sri Lankan government in 2015 
put on hold several Chinese infrastructure projects alleging graft, 
including a US$1.4 billion Colombo Port City project inaugurated 
by Chinese President Xi Jinping. The new finance minister said: 
“Chinese loans are a big part of our problem. A bulk of the govern-
ment expenditure goes into servicing them”, when he blamed the 
previous government for being corrupt and urged China to adjust 
the terms of the loans to make them more viable.13 In this regard, 
debt forgiveness every few years has been a part of China’s diplo-
matic relations with developing countries. However, it is doubtful 
that China would allow frequent defaults in its future infrastruc-
ture projects as its domestic economy slows down and regards the 
infrastructure export largely as an instrument to export over capac-
ity. As Zimbabwe headed for an economic crisis in 2015, China 
seconded officials and experts to the Office of the President and 
government departments in Harare to advise the government there 
on economic governance to reduce the risk of default and financial 
leakage in Chinese-invested mega infrastructure projects.14
 
Broken contracts are another risk in Chinese invested infrastruc-
ture projects. It is quite a common practice among construction 
companies within China to win project contracts by bidding at very 
low prices and then demand a higher price after the contract has 
been signed and the project is under construction, citing unex-
pected costs from materials, natural conditions and so on. The 
same practice backfired in the highway project between Warsaw 
and Berlin, when neither the Polish government nor the Chinese 
government wished to step in to help the Chinese Railway Con-
struction Company by subsidizing extra costs. The Polish govern-
ment cancelled the contract, and the Chinese manager in Poland 
was demoted to a position in China.15 However, now central and 
eastern European countries compete to be a port or hub of China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative. Poland is again wooing Chinese invest-
ment in other infrastructure projects.
Favouritism towards state-owned companies
An important feature of the new development initiatives would be 
cooperation between governments, policy banks, and public-private 
partnership (PPP). The big infrastructure projects usually need gov-
 9 Jamil Anderlini, ’China: Overborrowed and Overbuilt’, Financial Times, 
29 January 2015.
10 Minxin Pei, ’Why China keeps throwing trillions in investments down the 
drain’, Fortune, 1 Dec. 2014.
11 ’OECD Economic Surveys China’, March 2015, p.20, http://www.oecd.
org/eco/surveys/China-2015-overview.pdf.
12 Kun Zuo, ’Critical Issues in the Next Decade of China’s Infrastructure 
Effort’, McKinsey Rethinking Infrastructure: Voices from the Global Infra-
structure Initiative, May 2014.
13 ‘Let bygones be bygones, Colombo urges Beijing, as Chinese loans take 
their toll’, South China Morning Post, 18 Oct. 2015. After China sent spe-
cial envoys to Colombo for negotiations, the two countries decided in 
April 2016 to turn the Colombo Port City project from real estate to a 
financial hub.
14 ‘Cautious Chinese Handheld Mugabe’, Zimbabwe Independent, 14 Aug. 
2015.
15 ‘Chinese Builder Loses Showpiece Polish Highway Deal’, The Wall Street 
Journal, 14 Jun. 2011.
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ernment participation for the huge amount of capital, usage of land 
and natural resources, and policy coordination. State involvement 
is sometimes regarded by observers within China and abroad as an 
advantage of the Chinese model of development, involving swift 
decision-making processes, the ability to gather various resources 
and actors, and the ability to invest in long-term projects, amongst 
others. There is always a risk with government projects globally – 
corruption, and the construction sector is known as a ‘grey sector’ 
within China too. This policy brief will not delve into the problem of 
corruption, except to say that transparency is needed in all the bid-
ding, financing and implementation processes of the projects. Even 
if all the practices are legal, there is a potential downside to govern-
ment-led projects too: the bias towards state-owned companies. 
In China, SOEs have been monopolies in heavy industries, and state 
banks prefer them for the implicit or explicit government guarantee. 
Because of the rotating door between SOE managers and government 
officials, they naturally share common interests in taking the com-
manding height of the economy. Railways, roads, and other infrastruc-
tural projects in China are widely considered ‘non-competitive sectors’ 
and given the nickname ‘iron roosters’ (tiegongji) - meaning that they 
do not give many feathers (profits) away. In the stimulus packages dur-
ing the financial crisis, most of the investments in infrastructure and 
public works went to SOEs, leaving SMEs with little opportunity or 
incentive to invest. This exacerbated the problem of income inequality 
in China, with the income gap between SOEs and the national aver-
age widening significantly. As the government has continued to pump 
stimulus packages into the economy after the crisis, the SOEs harbour 
even more over-capacity. Overseas infrastructure projects are a strate-
gic outlet for exporting their overcapacity. The Chinese government is 
also trying to attract private investment in infrastructure projects and 
encouraging PPP. As private companies are suspicious of how much 
benefits there would be in PPP or other joint investments with SOEs, 
the government is trying to define the respective rights, obligations, 
risks, and revenues of both public- and private-sector partners. As in 
domestic projects, China encourages PPP in its overseas infrastructure 
projects and the distribution of benefits will depend on the actual con-
tracts and negotiation powers of public and private actors.
Conclusion
China’s infrastructure projects have made tremendous contribu-
tions to the development of both China and many other developing 
countries. Compared with stringent conditionalities on democracy 
and good governance demanded by traditional donors, China only 
demands the host country government to respect the ‘One China’ 
principle. Chinese construction companies are often much cheaper, 
with experience and skills accumulated over the years and adapted 
to tough working conditions in developing countries, construction 
time much shorter, and their offers are often a bundled package 
with robust and cheap capital. Compared with other investors who 
demand hefty co-financing or government guarantee before they can 
start instilling their own share and start construction, Chinese con-
struction companies agree to start construction immediately if host 
countries agree to repay the cost by exporting natural resources to 
some other Chinese firms. In this way, Chinese development banks 
even avoid money lost in the pockets of corrupt host country offi-
cials because money only flows between Chinese players. The recent 
initiatives by China to launch new development banks will undoubt-
edly continue to contribute to infrastructure construction in both 
developing and developed countries in similar ways.
There are however risks to the fast expansion of infrastructure 
investment through China’s new development banks. Given an over-
whelmingly positive international response to financing in order to 
fill in the infrastructure gap, this policy brief argues that a more care-
ful and nuanced perspective on the role of infrastructure in develop-
ment is needed, based on a rough review of China’s infrastructure 
projects both at home and abroad. Environmental and labour issues 
aside, three economic matters will determine whether the ambi-
tious infrastructure projects will be beneficial to local development 
or even sustainable themselves: the match between infrastructure 
supply and local demand, the debt and financing terms, and the 
distribution of benefits to companies and the wider population. Only 
when adequate decision-making, bidding and project supervision 
mechanisms are set up can there be a better chance of infrastructure-
led growth translating into infrastructure-led development.
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